It has been said that the success of any democracy depends on the participation of its citizens. Indeed, our governmental, economic, and social institutions (explicit or otherwise) require the conscious and informed participation of all of us. We are the juries for our peers. We vote for our political representatives. We celebrate our communities and mourn the fallen. Our lives are full of situations that require us to express our best opinions, feelings, and judgments. Herein lies the need for rhetoric, a means by which we can offer those things and gain an understanding of what those things require of us in the first place. Given the “need” for rhetoric, which author – Plato, Aristotle, Burke – seems to provide the most valuable understanding of it? In other words, if our citizenship requires the use of rhetoric in the normal course of our lives, which view of rhetoric might prove most useful? Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The central activity of rhetoric, of course, is the physical act of offering our opinions and best judgments: speaking with the intent to persuade. The basic concept of rhetorical study, then, is an inspection of the means by which one persuades one's audience. In my opinion, the most important aspect of our authors' concept of rhetoric is that of “audience” (where an audience is the collective recipient of the speaker's machinations). Indeed, it is through each author's consideration of this concept – of the centrality of the audience in an operational concept of rhetoric – that I will proceed to contrast the three main views of rhetoric and decide which view is most valuable. I consider how the author treats and understands the audience to be the best indicator of the value of his concept of rhetoric. In this sense, the Burkean concept of rhetoric seems to be the most valuable. It does not entirely abandon Aristotelian or Platonic views of rhetoric but, rather, redefines those views with the audience as the central consideration. To support this, I will briefly explain the Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of rhetoric and highlight how these views consider the role of the audience. Then, I will compare these visions with the Burkean ideal, showing why this vision is, in my opinion, the most valuable. The Platonic concept of rhetoric arises from (or, rather, is inhabited by) Plato's contempt for the group of Greeks. rhetoricians known as the Sophists. This animosity resulted from Plato's belief that the sophists evolved into educators more interested in winning their arguments and advancing their own personal interests than in defining and teaching rhetoric as a practical and useful skill (Boyd). In Gorgias, Plato criticizes the sophists and constructs a dialogue that indicts rhetoric as a false skill, which does not improve its audience but merely practices flattery. This dialogue takes the form of a discussion between Gorgias and Socrates, as Socrates asks Gorgias to define rhetoric. Gorgias argues that rhetoric is "responsible for the freedom of man himself, and at the same time for dominion over others in his own city" (452d6-7). This, coincidentally, is a valuable point about the importance of rhetoric in democracy; if we want to govern ourselves, we must use rhetoric to govern. The concern of rhetoric is “persuasion, and that all its labor and its sum result in this” (453a3-4). Gorgias, therefore, conceives the practice of rhetoric as something of substantial benefit. Socrates, however, questions the validity of Gorgias' notions. He asks, “Can you mention more rhetorical powerbroader than that of producing persuasion in the souls of the listeners?" (453a4-5). For Socrates, the purpose of rhetoric is only to instill beliefs and persuade; in other words, it does not produce understanding or knowledge in the listener and is, therefore, an ignoble skill (455a1-2). Argues that the speaker's ultimate goal is that of flattery, not the belief of an honest truth in his audience. The production of an argument of truth, Socrates says, belongs to philosophers , not to rhetoricians. It is in Gorgias' defense of rhetoric that the Platonic notion of audience begins to emerge. Gorgias states that rhetoric is a powerful craft, and the rhetorician is entrusted with great power to "speak against anyone about anything. , so as to be more persuasive among the masses, in short, whatever he wants" (457a6-8). . Gorgias states that the rhetorician is well aware of justice and truth, but Socrates refutes this notion, saying instead that the rhetorician he simply "seems to know, rather than the man knowing" (459e7). In light of these conceptions, Plato's vision of the rhetorician's audience is like that of a blank canvas, on which the rhetorician can paint his own opinions. In all of Gorgias' dialogue, no character belies the audience's perception that he is somehow vulnerable, unable to distinguish flattery from substance. Indeed, much of the interaction between Gorgias and Sophocles is spurred by Gorgias' promises that rhetoricians will use their seemingly omnipotent abilities for good, not malice. Furthermore, the interests of Plato's audience are a given; the audience seems to be made up of reluctant onlookers who demand to be persuaded by gentle flattery rather than by sound, skillfully executed arguments. Indeed, this reaction to flattery seems to be the only obligation of the Platonic audience. Unlike this view of the speaker-audience dynamic as mostly one-way (barring the audience's approval to be flattered), the Aristotelian concept of rhetoric requires that the rhetorician establish a measure of credibility with his audience and, thus, grants to the public agency. In On Rhetoric, Aristotle outlines his theory of rhetoric – rhetoric, again, concerned with persuasion – as a technical craft that relies on three “modes” of persuasion. The first, ethos, depends on the character of the speaker; the second, pathos, in bringing the audience into a certain mental condition; the third, logos, on logical proof. Ethos is achieved when the speaker establishes his credibility; the person we perceive as "good" is more credible than the one we consider "bad". Pathos is based on the fact that our emotions have a great impact on our decision making. An audience put into a friendly or happy attitude by a speaker is likely to be much more receptive than if they were angry or disinterested. Logos is based on the effective irrefutability of logic. If, for example, we argue that 2 - 1 = 1 and we are able to prove that 1 + 1 = 2, it follows that our argument, 2 - 1 = 1, must be true. If the aim of rhetoric is persuasion, Aristotle argues, these three modes are the means by which we might achieve that persuasion. “It is clear,” says Aristotle, “that grasping understanding is the function of those who know how to reason logically and be attentive to characters and virtues and, thirdly, to emotions” (1356a). Aristotle's approach to defining rhetorical values ​​is audience in a way that Plato's concept does not. This is illustrated in Aristotle's ethos mode, the first element of a rhetorical vision, so far, which is primarily concerned with the audience. The audience is mobilized, at least to a small extent, by participating in the formation of the rhetorician's argumentassigning credibility and value to the personal character of the speaker. For Aristotle, the power to persuade effectively does not rest exclusively with the speaker (as Gorgias says). The audience also has the power to judge the character of the speaker before opening up to his arguments. Ethos, in fact, is the first of the three modes of Aristotelian rhetoric because it is the mode that acts as a requirement for the others; without credibility, the speaker's efforts at pathos and logos fall on deaf ears. The pathos mode could be seen as more or less similar to Socrates' (Gorgias') belief that rhetoric is based on flattery. But the fundamental difference between that belief and the Aristotelian concept is a difference in the degree to which the audience is given confidence in choosing its own disposition. The pathos of the Platonic audience seems to be basic; flatter, and they will meet their arguments with acceptance. Aristotle approaches audience disposition by recognizing that there is more to temperament than being happy or sad (such as invoking sympathy or attempting to stimulate the audience's interest in the topic to begin with). The Burkean concept of rhetoric places an even greater emphasis on the audience. Burke defines rhetoric as “the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or induce actions in other human agents” (41). Indeed, understanding one's audience ("human agents") is central to Burke's concept of rhetoric, described in terms of "identification" and "consubstantiality": A is not identical to his colleague B. But to the extent that their interests are united, A identifies with B. Or he can identify with B even when their interests are not joint, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so. […] In identifying with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time it remains unique, a place of individual motivation. Therefore it is conjoined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another. (20-1) In other words, the idea of ​​consubstantiality is that we share the substances of our personal lives – careers, friends, beliefs, hobbies, even possessions – with other people. It is in that sharing that we become consubstantial. Identifying “A” with “B” means “making A 'consubstantial' with B” (21). Therefore, establishing an idea of ​​consubstantiality helps to establish a more precise idea of ​​a public: a group of individuals who share particular substances. The idea of ​​identification is the method by which consubstantiality is established; substances shared with others are identified and the absence of other substances is dealt with. Burke states: “Identification compensates for division. If men were not separated from each other, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (22). For Burke, identification is what rhetorical action should be based on. “Persuade a man only to the extent that you can speak his language by word, gesture, tone, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his,” he says (55). For Burke, identification is more than an element of persuasion; it's persuasion. Since identification is a transaction between the speaker and his audience (as the speaker reads an audience to identify their respective substances), it is clear that the Burkean concept of rhetoric is the most audience-centered, by his thesis – that identification should be the rhetor's central action–it is an argument for the audience. In the Burkean rhetorical model, the audience is not limited in its action as in the Platonic model. Burke establishes a similarity, however, when he invokes Plato's interest in flattery, saying: “Flattery is [not genuine persuasion] but a special case of persuasion in general. But flattery can)..