Topic > South Korea's developmental state experience has been unique

IndexThe legacy of Japanese colonialismA new economic composition"Embodied autonomy" through a strong state-capital relationshipRepression of the working classesThis answer will evaluate whether the of South Korea's development was a unique phenomenon in economic development or whether it could actually be replicated elsewhere. Before delving into the issue itself it is necessary to briefly explain that the “developmental state model” is characterized by high levels of regulation and government intervention led by a specific development elite; a powerful and isolated economic bureaucracy; a weak and deeply subordinated civil society; efficient management of non-state economic interests and harsh repression of the general population. We say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay In reference to the question, this answer will examine a number of significant factors that have enabled the long-term success of South Korea's developmental state: the significance of historical context such as the legacy of Japanese colonialism as well as wars of Korea and Vietnam, the changes in the economic composition of the nation, the repression of the working classes, the state-capital relationship and finally the way in which interconnected "embedded" autonomy has enabled successful development. Ultimately, we come to the conclusion that the legacy of Japanese colonialism laid the foundation for the other factors mentioned to occur and helped South Korea effectively implement the state model of development, making this experience unique due to the historical context. colonialism Finally, the most significant factor in which the South Korean model is unique compared to other late industrialized countries such as India and Brazil was that "the furrows that Japanese colonialism made on the Korean social soil had a profound effect." These “ruts” that Kohli speaks of were most evident across a number of key identifiers left behind by the Japanese colonialist state, for example, the presence of a strong state-capital relationship, a merit-fueled technocracy, a newly built education system, and robust government ministries. . These factors (to be mentioned throughout the answer) have combined to make South Korea almost a smaller version of Japan that would facilitate years of highly sustainable growth. Overall, it allowed for the presence of a strong centralized government and an interconnected bureaucracy that could control the lower classes with great ease and facilitate the economic expansion of exports with a focus on nurturing a specific "infant industry." However, the years of rapid development that South Korea witnessed during the second half of the 20th century were not achievable due to the legacy left by the institutions but also due to the influence that colonialism had on some individuals, particularly the new leader of the country Park Cheung -Hey. Recognized by many scholars as a “Japanese fascinated by the Meiji model,” which was vital in Japanese development for most of the 20th century, it is not surprising that Cheung-Hee did not believe that radical change was needed to witness a major explosion of development and he certainly wasn't wrong. It is clear that "Japan has created in Korea and Taiwan a unique colonial structure found nowhere else in the world." The flying geese model of "Japan" transmits industries to SK and other East Asian states, Japanese capital investments, the emergence of global production networks.A new economic compositionForanalyze whether South Korea's experience of the state model of development is unique, we will now examine the economic success achieved through high regulation and government intervention under the Democratic-Republican Party (DRP) regime. This will allow us to correctly evaluate the significance of the other factors mentioned in the introduction. The DRP of South Korea was first formed by Park Cheung-Hee's government on February 2, 1963 until its dissolution on September 1, 1980, not long after the aforementioned leader's assassination on October 26, 1979. L South Korea's implementation of the state model of development for much of the second half of the 20th century, following the May 1961 coup d'état, led by General Park Cheung-Hee until the end of 1979, was the first example of a late industrializer who effectively used a market-driven economy that prioritized widespread industrialization in order to maintain sizable levels of growth and development. Late industrializers can be defined as states that began the 20th century with lackluster levels of economic strength and that achieved drastic increases in per capita national income consistently over time by investing selectively in different industrial sectors. The term "late" serves to distinguish between early industrialized countries such as Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the United States of America. The newly founded Economic Planning Board (EPB) in South Korea introduced a five-year economic plan between 1962 and 1966 with one of the main stipulations of achieving a growth rate of the economy of 7.1% in this period. by focusing on export-oriented industrialization or EOI (exports growing 29% annually on average over the period), the South Korean economy exceeded this goal by actually achieving an average growth rate of 8.9%. Obviously such an upward growth rate led to a more accelerated industrialization process. This in turn meant that the state could invest further in industrial infrastructure, for example in the production of tungsten, iron and graphite, which would be more likely to help the economy in the long term by attracting foreign direct investment from countries such as the United States 'America and Japan. Clearly, South Korea's shift from import-substituting industrialization (ISI 1) in the 1950s (common in postcolonial nations) to export-oriented industrialization under the DRP regime was very successful and showed the importance of trade international. This is exemplified by the fact that, due to manufactured goods (and the removal of tariffs on imports if they were to be used in the production of exports), South Korea's share of merchandise exports in GDP has increased from just 2% in 1962 to 30% in 2019. less than 20 years." If South Korea's success is taken into account, we can recognize that the structural changes in its economy and its success with the EOI are not entirely replicable to that extent in other nations For example, the military junta that controlled Brazil in the same period used a mixture of EOI and ISI 1 and for a time this system of “dependent development” was enormously successful, especially between 1968 and 1973. the Latin American powerhouse reached astronomical levels of growth due to major agricultural and industrial expansion. This is supported by Brazil's gross national product (GNP) increasing by about 10% each year between 1967 and 1971, as well as the average pro income. capita in the same period increased by approximately 49%. (Fishlow, 1973: 475) However, this success would be short-lived when the 1973 oil shock puthighlighted Brazil's dependence on foreign capital, particularly investment from the United States, as well as highlighting the heavy dependence on imports on which the nation was built. Now, while South Korea wasn't exactly exempt from the impact of the 1973 oil crisis, as it witnessed massive increases in inflation of nearly 40%; it is evident that, due to Brazil's heavy dependence on imports and foreign capital, Brazil was particularly prone to possible exogenous shocks such as the second oil shock of 1979. The evidence presented in this section shows how economic planning led by the DPR regime and economic governance The Planning Board (EPB) has been highly sustainable within South Korea, while on the other hand countries have attempted to replicate the development model has found it much more difficult to sustain, reflecting the unique by SK. South Korea in order to stimulate the rapid industrialization referred to in the last paragraph. These chaebol can be defined as large industrial conglomerates that resided as important and powerful members of the Korean plutocracy, for example Kyungbang and Packsan Trading Company. Essentially, a strong state-capital relationship is extremely beneficial to both parties as it can dramatically reduce transaction costs between actors and ensure more effective policy formation and implementation. The ideas suggested by Evans also establish that, despite a strong relationship, the likelihood of a bureaucratic elite being overly influenced by big business interests must be minimal. This "isolation of the bureaucracy" was particularly effective because the state remained the dominant actor in the agreement, since it obviously had total control of all investments and credits, as well as being responsible for establishing performance evaluation criteria that the elites entrepreneurial could reach or achieve. they risk losing the benefits of the state-capital relationship. Furthermore, this leads to one of the most significant reasons why other countries have found it almost impossible to adequately replicate South Korea's success and that is the presence, or lack thereof, of large landowners. When Japanese colonial rule in the East Asian nation ended after World War II, the richest 2.7 percent of South Korean society (in terms of wealth) owned approximately 66 percent of all agricultural land; however, just nine years later, in 1956, the top 6 percent owned just under a fifth of total agricultural land. Now, the reason this is so significant is that the lack of large landowners meant that there was little or no desire to focus on the export of primary products as a means of boosting the economy. With little reliance on this form of industry, the DPR regime could remain totally dominant and not fear being subordinated to the interests of capital. Compared to another late industrialized country, Brazil, which today is the country with the most unequal level of land distribution globally, with 10% of Brazilian estates owning 75% of all agricultural land in the 2020. This fundamental difference illustrates how South Korea possessed an economy much more capable of modeling itself on a state model of sustainable development with its "deeper state-society configurations" making it much more unique than other developing nations development. The repression of the working classes, linked to the aforementioned "embodied autonomy" created by the state-capital relationship in South Korea during the second half of the 20th century; it was the constant repression of the South Korean population, especially the force..