In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle examines happiness, which is the good towards which every human action is directed. Entangled in this inquiry is Aristotle's discussion of ideas such as virtue, magnanimity, justice, and friendship, as well as the relationships between all of these. Before he can address these relationships, however, Aristotle must break down each of the ideas so that they can exist outside of mere relation to the others. Having done this, he can then build on each: from virtue, Aristotle builds to magnanimity; from magnanimity he builds to justice; and from justice he builds friendship. I will therefore take a similar approach in this essay, which aims to condense these relationships and identify any recurring themes, in particular the theme of equality. As he neared the end of his text, Aristotle also began to discuss the political implications of his work, which originated from the search for what was "the highest good." These implications therefore serve as an important and clarifying application of Aristotle's ideas, and I will then similarly conclude with the analysis of these implications. But, as Aristotle does, I must start with the elementary block that is the common search of every human being, namely happiness. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essayAristotle, who addresses "competent students of what is right and just", or in other words those who "have received adequate education" in moral conduct", is therefore addressing an audience other than which Plato does in the Republic (Ostwald, 7). He thus launches directly into the discussion on happiness, which Aristotle therefore defines as virtues as a mean between excess and deficiency in each case, later stating that humans must apply their unique function of rationality and reason to settle on this mean. Thus, for example, the mean between meanness and vanity is magnanimity or magnanimity. Virtue, which is divided into intellectual and moral virtues, can then be realized by a virtuous man who acts consciously, chooses the specific way in which he acts, and chooses this action for itself, making his action "right and just". self-control" (39). Within his discussion of virtue, Aristotle identifies multiple means that exist between excesses. The primary virtue, however, and one that essentially builds on the other virtues discussed, is magnanimity or magnanimity. As magnificence, even magnanimity operates on a large scale: but while magnificence eclipses lack of generosity, magnanimity eclipses small honors. So it is then "in matters of honor and dishonor that the noble man has the right attitude." Indeed, "he considers himself worthy of honor above all else" (94). The magnanimous, on the other hand, deserves what is greater because it is greater, and "The high mind is like the crown of virtues: it magnifies them. and cannot exist without them" (95). Responsible for this position of magnanimity with respect to the other virtues is its relationship with nobility, which "is common to all virtues" (90). truly noble “without goodness and nobility” (95). So nobility is what allows the magnanimous to embody all the virtues and build on them. Building then on his discussion of the virtues, and particularly "high-mindedness," Aristotle moves on to justice. Like magnanimity, justice is a virtue, and therefore a middle ground between two extremes. Since, Aristotle writes, "the 'just' is what is lawful and just, and the 'unjust' is what is unlawful and unjust", and therefore the just man does not take too much,nor too little of what is his share (112). ). In this sense, even the just man is worthy of choice, since his actions prove virtuous. Indeed, as Aristotle claims, "justice is considered the highest of all virtues and, as the proverb says, 'Every virtue is summed up in justice'" (114). At first glance, then, immediate connections can be drawn between magnanimity, from which Aristotle derived justice, and justice, both of which are umbrellas for the other virtues. This parallel, however, does not last long, since Aristotle distinguishes justice as "complete virtue", "because whoever possesses it can make use of his virtue not only in himself, but also in relationships with his peers" (114) . Therefore, while magnanimity allows the individual to know what he deserves, justice allows the individual to know what others, including himself, deserve. Justice then takes the ability of high-minded people and applies it on a community level with interpersonal relationships. Aristotle then offsets his characterization of complete justice with what he calls partial justice, a term that begins to consider issues of equality and fairness in what is "just." The theme of equality, however, was first evoked in his discussion of high-minded individuals, who were more fortunate than narrow-minded and vain individuals. That is, "the gifts of fortune, it is believed, also contribute to magnanimity" since "men of noble birth, power, or wealth are considered worthy of honor" (96). Aristotle then considers this reality of inequality in what he calls “merit,” when he begins his discussion of partial justice. Partial justice itself has two forms: one is "what is right, in the distribution of honors", among other things, and the other is what is right in "a rectifying function", and each takes a unique position on the equality and fairness ( 117). Aristotle first discusses distributive justice, which derives from a characterization of justice as just and fair. Here Aristotle's argument follows the reality of the high mentality, according to which not everyone possesses equal merit, and therefore in receiving what each deserves, the distribution of honor, material goods and "anything else that can be divided between those who have a share in the political system" should be done in proportion to their merit (117). Therefore, as Aristotle writes, "If the people are not equal, their (fair) shares will not be equal" and "consequently, the right is something proportionate" (118, 119). There is, however, equality in the sense that "proportion is equality of relations", and therefore right in this sense requires that equality be applied only in relations, whose proportions they are unequal (119). On the other hand it applies a new sense of equality, trying to maintain the status quo, or balance, through the transactions carried out by citizens. While the just in a distributive sense tries to distribute common funds according to "geometrical" proportions ", as Aristotle defines it, the just in the rectifying sense seeks to carry out transactions according to "arithmetic" proportions. Here justice then takes the form of a sort of blind justice, "it treats the parties as equals and asks only whether one has committed a wrong and the other has suffered a wrong" (121). This justice is ultimately carried out by a judge, who tries to restore the balance by identifying the median between gain and loss in the conflict, regardless of the merits of the parties involved. Aristotle concludes his examination of justice by returning to its meaning more broadly, and particularly as it is found in political matters. As Aristotle writes, "The right in politics is found among men who share acommon life so that their association leads them to self-sufficiency, and that they are free and equal, both proportionally and arithmetically" (129). From here, Aristotle can then construct friendship, which will necessarily imply virtues such as magnanimity, but always to community level. As Aristotle claims, "justice, alone among all the virtues, is considered the good of another, because it is a relationship with our fellow men in that it does what is of advantage to others" (114). this sense, as justice is built on high mentality, so does friendship, which Aristotle claims to be the medium between obsequiousness and flattery, builds Friendship however shares similarities with magnanimity, the crowning virtue, for it exists in its best form among similar or similar individuals. Thus, according to Aristotle, a noble-minded man will "completely despise the honors bestowed by common people and for trivial reasons, because it is not what he deserves" (95). Likewise, friendships are not disposed toward similar-dissimilar associations because they are equally less rewarding in unequal associations. Aristotle therefore declares that "The perfect form of friendship is that between good men, similar in excellence and virtue" (219). Friendship then plays a significant role in community relations. This beneficial role is the result of the mutual care that friends lend themselves to each other where, as Aristotle writes that a friend will “bear, and equally refuse to bear, the right things in the right way” (103). Likewise, “friends help young people avoid the mistake; they give the elderly the care and help necessary to integrate the weak capacity for action that illness brings with it; and to those in the prime of life they give the opportunity to perform noble deeds" (215). Friends therefore essentially provide those without high minds with guidance in choosing right actions and living virtuously. Of course, genuine friendships such as described above are more frequent already among individuals of good virtue, but considering friendship in terms of the capacity of high-minded people shows the thread that connects virtue at the individual level with the virtue that exists in the community level, or when they are in game justice and friendship. It is also useful to think of friendship here as the accumulation of a second self, or soul. That is, since the soul is the origin of the contemplative life of reason and logic, as well as the he origin of choices, a friend is the soul or complement of the self since it also performs these functions. Aristotle also discusses friendship in terms of equality above all similarity of those who are similar in virtue" (230). But just as equality has taken on different meanings in justice, so it happens in friendship where it can exist in a quantitative (rectifying) and proportional (distributive) sense. To illustrate this difference, Aristotle first discusses friendships between equals and between unequals. After discussing equals, Aristotle concludes: "In summary, the friendships we have discussed so far are based on equality; both partners receive and desire the same thing from and for each other" (226) . Shortly thereafter Aristotle presents the other version of equality found in friendships between unequals. Here Aristotle concludes: "In all friendships involving the superiority of one of the partners, affection must also be proportionate: the better and more useful partner should receive more affection than he gives" (227). Therefore, as in justice, equality in friendships can take the form of a quantitative exchange, as well as a proportionate one; however there is one final difference that Aristotle identifies. That is, in justice, proportional equality overcomes events.