To what extent did royal authority decline in the years 1589 to 1603? In the years 1589 to 1603 royal authority irrefutably declined, with much of the general public becoming convinced that Elizabeth's previously claimed "heart and stomach of a king" were effectively succumbing to the "body of a feeble and feeble woman ". " Age had overshadowed the “Gloriana” and in some areas this once authoritative majesty seemed on the brink of the abyss, especially with regards to the drastic social unrest caused by the bad harvests of 1597 and 1598, and inflation of uncontrolled mass.However, this royal authority had by no means been eradicated and opposition was still being dealt with swiftly – if anything more forcefully than before, given Elizabeth's growing irascibility – evidenced by her 'golden' response to the Parliament of 1601. and by the loyalty of the authority in displacing the Essex rebellion. Thus, although it had diminished to a large extent over his long forty-five years as monarch, the preservation of prerogatives (despite concessions on monopolies – a pragmatic response which did not necessarily weaken it). ) and his ability to arrest any challenge (such as the persistent nuisance Wentworth) demonstrated that the royal power was still the highest authority in the country. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Undeniably, the deaths of many of his key ministers dealt a crippling blow to his royal authority, from which he never truly recovered, with the weaker replacements of Cecil junior and the disastrous Essex – for these administrators were crucial to enforcing his will. With the deaths of Mildmay in 1589 and Hatton in 1591, Elizabeth not only lost skilled implementers of her policies, but also the puppeteers who had pulled the strings of the House of Commons. Burghley's illness ensured that he was confined to a minor role for the 1590s, while Leicester had died in early 1588: into this political vacuum stepped the irascible Essex and Robert Cecil, who had been groomed for the role of his father. Robert, Secretary of State from 1596, was politically savvy and may have successfully manipulated Parliament with the right support, but as AGR Smith describes him, his colleagues were "mediocrities", so he was hampered in such a way that the combined might of Knollys, Mildmay and Hatton had never been there. This served to undermine Elizabeth's royal authority, as without the ability to keep parliamentarians in check – apart from much-used prerogatives – she had a lesser role in implementing legislation. Of course, royal approval still remained the final stage, but there were no longer powerful enough servants through whom his authority could manipulate the President and generally direct the course of the sessions. Furthermore, the arrival of Robert and Essex in the Privy Council upset the balance of a once cohesive and successful mechanism, as factionalism came to the fore as never before. While this was potentially a major problem for Elizabeth's authority – as the Council was often the instrument through which her effective policies could be worked out and, in some cases, brought to Parliament – ​​it managed to largely limit its destructiveness , showing one of the rare glimpses of the powerful royal authority that remained in this later phase. Through the reward of patronage he was able to limit Essex's greedy ambition, offering key positions as Master of the Court of Wards to Cecil in 1599, and essentially isolating any royal power from Essex andfrom his faction (modifying to some extent the poor judgment that had brought him into its innermost ring.) The arrival of these new ministers represents, indisputably, a weakening of Elizabeth's royal authority, by Cecil to because of the enormous political vacuum he was trying to fill, and on Essex's part because of his recklessness and introduction of disuniting factionalism. However, Robert Cecil was still an able administrator and capable of carrying out Elizabeth's will, and his careful management of the Essex wildcard allowed her to maintain authority over her Council. However, his restriction of patronage to Leicester probably failed, as it was one of the many factors that led to his rebellion of 1601. His march through London was the last attempt to challenge royal authority – usurp the queen – but the the fact that it was so unsuccessful lends credence to the remnants of his authority; tarnished as it was, in moments of crisis it still seemed to shine. It might be said that Elizabeth no longer possessed the authority to keep her ministers in check, which to some extent was true: her age had tampered with her temperament and made her much more lenient towards her favourites. Perhaps if Essex had sat next to a younger Elizabeth, his constant disobedience would have quickly stripped him of his ranks rather than allowing him to explode into rebellion. This thought aside, the Essex Rebellion did not truly challenge royal authority. Williams described it as “the visible tip of a wider range of discontent”, but although there was serious discontent with socio-economic conditions, the Essex attempt was not connected to this at all; it was the last desperate roll of the dice from an unstable man on the brink of destruction. The fact that it lasted only twelve hours shows how little challenge it posed. Furthermore, it was far less spectacular than the Northern Rebellion of 1569 had been, and thus perhaps demonstrated that not only had Elizabeth's royal authority re-emerged in the face of the crisis, but also that its very core had not been weakened. (Of course the alternative argument is that Elizabeth in her final years would not have survived a more rational rebellion.) However, the persistent loyalty of the masses and, above all, the London authorities ensured that her royal authority remained strong in the face of opposition . and therefore it had not gone beyond redemption. The real test of royal authority, however, was the growing socio-economic crisis that plagued the final years of his reign. Bad harvests in 1597 and 1598, the resulting 80% increase in the price of corn, a mortality rate estimated at around 6%, and the lowest real wages since before the Black Death meant that this was the most dangerous threat to royal authority. After all, it was a socioeconomically based rebellion (that of Kett in 1549) that had helped ensure the fall of Somerset. The fact that Elizabeth's regime managed to weather this storm is not sufficient evidence to claim that her royal authority was strong, or that it actually persisted, rather than resisted. Riots broke out in London, Oxfordshire and Norfolk but fortunately for Elizabeth they posed no popular threat; similarly the Oxfordshire 'Riots' only gathered four people. While this in itself posed no threat (although from the brutal consequences for the "rebels" one might think it had almost overthrown the Tudors), it revealed the potential for a catastrophic crisis and vast social upheaval; the “wider range of discontent” noted by Williams. Some credit must be given to the Crown and its ministers for the success of social legislation – the Poor..