Before the start of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress showed little interest in creating a navy for the new nation (Nelson 62). Congress was reluctant to provide funds to buy or build ships, purchase supplies, or pay sailors to man the ships. When the Revolution began, however, Congress realized that it was important for American ships to patrol the new nation's coasts, especially since the British naval force was the most powerful at the time (Frayler). As a result, the Americans turned to privateering. Privateers were privately owned vessels and were similar to pirate ships. Unlike pirates, privateers were authorized by the government to attack ships belonging to an enemy. Privateering during the Revolution financially benefited both sailors and colonists and aided the Continental Army by providing supplies. American privateers, commissioned by the Continental Congress and the colonies, played an important role in the development of the United States and the outcome of the Revolutionary War. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Beginning in 1775, soon after the Revolutionary War began, the Continental Congress and individual colonies began commissioning privateers (Konstam 148). In November 1775, the Massachusetts General Court passed “An Act For Encouraging the Fixing out of Amed Vessels” (Patton 27). This act allowed citizens to “equip any vessel to sail upon the seas, attack, take, and bring into any port of this colony all vessels offensive or employed by the enemy” (qtd. in Patton 27). Furthermore, it outlined the correct procedure for obtaining commissions and creating reward courts to distribute the captured wealth. The Continental Congress passed an act on March 23, 1776, which formalized the commission process and established rules of conduct for privateers (Frayler). The act required owners of privateer ships to issue monetary bonds to verify that they would adhere to congressional regulations. (Frayler). The commission requests required the applicant to provide a sum of money up to $10,000 as a promise to treat prisoners with “the utmost humanity and tenderness” (Patton 98). Applicants were charged $5,000 if the vessel weighed less than 100 tons and $10,000 if it was larger (Kuhl 86). In another act, passed April 3, 1776, Congress issued instructions for commanders of privateer ships. The act authorized commanders to "attack, subdue and take by force of arms all ships and other vessels belonging to the inhabitants of Great Britain on the high seas" and "by force of arms attack, subdue and take all ships "vessels and other vessels of any kind carrying soldiers, arms, gunpowder, ammunition, provisions, or any other contraband, to any British Army or warship employed against these colonies" (qtd. in Salem Maritime National Historic Site ) As the Massachusetts law suggested, any ship could become a privateer (Patton 27). While this quickly increased the number of privateers on the seas, it allowed ships of any condition to become privateers continental schooner, was captured by the British, the Royal Navy deemed her unfit for sea or war, suggesting that not all privateers were in the best condition when commissioned (Patton 32-33). The physical state of a ship was important, but its size was equally significant. The largest ship was the Caesar, a 600-ton, 26-gun vessel, while the smallest was the 8-gun Defense (Frayler).tons. The most common ships were two-masted schooners and brigantines. By early 1776, ships of all sizes were sailing in the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the Canadian coast (Konstam 148). To become a privateer, the ship's owner had to receive a letter of marque and retaliation. These documents promised that the bearers would not be prosecuted as pirates by their home nation (History Channel). If a ship attacked another ship but did not have a letter of marque, the attackers were considered pirates and could be hanged for their crimes (Kuhl 12). Letters of marque provided additional protection to the bearer because they guaranteed that captured privateers would be treated as prisoners of war rather than criminals by the foreign nation (History Channel). Documentation from this period is incomplete, but approximately 1,700 letters of marque were issued per voyage to Revolutionary privateers (Frayler). Although the letters of marque were supposed to protect privateers, the promises made by Congress were never fully fulfilled. because the British passed the Pirate Act in March 1777 (Patton 34). Under this law, privateers were considered pirates and were denied both due process in British courts and the opportunity for prisoner exchange. As a result, many captured American privateers were incarcerated and had only three options to get out: join the Royal Navy, escape, or die. Even before the Pirate Act was passed, the English often treated their prisoners poorly (Kuhl 43). However, it is worth noting that many British citizens disagreed with the poor conditions to which American privateers were subjected, and many opponents called the Pirate Act “cruel, persecutory,” and “shocking to humanity” (qtd. in Patton 142). In December 1777, approximately one hundred Londoners gathered and raised £1,300 for American convicts so they could purchase goods that would otherwise not have been available to them (Patton 143-144). Three members of the House of Lords also contributed money to the cause, and charities and churches donated food and other supplies. The risk of capture, imprisonment or death did not dissuade sailors and citizens from rushing to become privateers. Men continued to join privateering ships because of the promise of wealth. Although privateers received no pay for their service beyond the loot they stole from British ships, many men signed up to become privateers because they could quickly earn a large sum of money (Konstam 148). Privateering was so profitable that it was possible for a man to earn more money in a month as a privateer than he could earn in another occupation in an entire year (Patton xvii). There is at least one known example of a sailor, Joseph Peabody, who went from humble sailor to privateer investor by participating in just nine voyages between 1777 and 1783 (Patton 115). In August 1776, John Adams observed, “Thousands of privateering schemes float in the American imagination. From these speculations will arise many unsuccessful projects and some profitable projects” (qtd. in Patton 113). When a ship was captured by privateers, it was usually taken to a friendly port (Kuhl 33). Privateer ship crews tended to be larger than normal because some of the crew had to board the captured vessel and set sail. Goods captured by privateers, called prizes, were usually subject to judgment in an Admiralty court (Kuhl 12). The Admiralty court decided whether the kidnappers were entitled to payment and whether they had followed the correct protocols (Kuhl 87). To receive payment, the prize had to arrive at port with the correct documentation and cargoentire; he must have been captured by an enemy; furthermore the prisoners could not be harmed and their personal effects could not be confiscated. However, in some cases of extreme necessity, supplies could be sent to the Army without being invoiced (Patton 120). In the case of the merchant ship Lively, the cargo of clothes and blankets was sent directly to American troops, and the hijackers did not receive payment for the supplies, which were estimated to be worth £25,000. When the Admiralty court decided that the crew had followed the correct protocols, the prize would then be auctioned off and the crew would be paid (Patton 121). Once paid, privateers tended to split the payment equally between crew and owners (Kuhl 51). In some cases, when the military bid on supplies, the public sometimes refrained from bidding (Patton 121). While this saved the government money, it reduced the payment the crew would receive. Once the auction ended, the winning bidder was usually required to immediately pay five percent of the purchase price (Patton 118). In its infancy, revolutionary privateering was a disaster. The first privateer, the Hannah, would cause numerous problems for Congress (Nelson 87). The captain of the Hannah was reluctant to sail far from port, so he often seized merchant ships belonging to fellow Americans (Patton 30). The first vessel Hannah captured was the Unity, a Continental transport belonging to a member of Congress. Although Unity had been captured by the English, Hannah's crew received no payment for recapturing the transport ship. As a result, thirty-six enraged crew members mutinied and were punished when the mutiny was finally quelled (Patton 31). The next seven ships captured by Hannah also belonged to Americans, and damages had to be paid from Continental funds for merchandise stolen by the crew members. Another early privateer, the Washington, captured only one legitimate booty (a cargo of hay) before being captured by the English after only eight days of service (Patton 32). Despite discouraging beginnings, not all privateering ventures were disastrous. Lee, a small schooner with a crew of 50 men, managed to capture Nancy, a transport vessel four times the size of the Lee (Patton 35). Despite Nancy's size, Lee managed to capture the transport ship because Nancy's crew were disoriented after riding through a storm and had mistaken the Lee for a Royal Navy ship. The British ship was loaded with valuable supplies: tons of ammunition, thousands of weapons, and a three-thousand-pound mortar were all seized for use by the Continental Army. The cargo had an estimated value of between £10,000 and £30,000. In 1776, the Continental schooner Franklin intercepted the three hundred ton British transport Hope (Patton 44). Hope carried numerous cannons and muskets, as well as seventy-five tons of gunpowder, making it the most valuable prize captured during the Revolution. When Hope and the cargo were finally auctioned off, they would sell for more than $1.5 million (Patton 118). A Salem privateer called the Rattlesnake captured more than $1 million in prizes on a single cruise (Konstam 148). The Connecticut Privateer Defense successfully captured two British transports, George and Annabella, and a third ship within a few days (Kuhl 41-42). Captured ships carried necessary equipment, including tent supplies, blankets, cooking supplies, clothing, small arms, and bayonets (Kuhl 44). Washington immediately demanded that thesesupplies were sent to the Continental Army stationed in New York. Sailors were not the only ones who profited from government-backed piracy against British fleets. Many ports, including those of Salem, Baltimore, and especially Boston, benefited from privateers operating off their coasts (Konstam 148). General Washington praised Bostonians for “the valuable prizes which have lately been brought into your port. We need all your activity to increase our supplies by these means” (qtd. in Patton 107). Rhode Island also benefited, and between April and November 1776, prizes worth an estimated £300,000 were brought to Providence (Patton 91). Sailors on privateer ships often promised future earnings to creditors as a way to pay off debts (Patton 79-80 ). If the sailor's earnings exceeded the amount of the debt, the agreement allowed the creditor to keep the difference. Investors made money by owning and trading shares of private individuals (Patton 80). The value of these shares depended on the quality of the ship and the competence of the crew. A sixteenth of a share in a small privateer cost £56 during the war (Patton 91). Manufacturing companies in the colonies also profited. A cannon company owned by the Brown family in Providence, Rhode Island, sold their cannons for £35 a ton (Patton 88). Congress ordered sixty twelve- and eighteen-pounder guns for their privateers, and one former congressman ordered twenty-six guns (Patton 89). However, because many of the weapons produced by the Brown company went to private ships who prepaid and paid extra for the weapons, customers such as Congress had to wait a long period of time for their weapons to be produced (Patton 90). Although privateers aided the American cause by providing goods and weapons to the Continental Army, privateering had one disadvantage: privateers were owned by individuals, rather than the Navy or government, so they were not obligated to fight enemy ships (Nelson 285 ). While this helped maximize profits for the privateers, it limited their usefulness in warfare. However, targeting merchant ships aided the revolutionary cause by placing financial pressure on English merchants (Kuhl 51). The Americans knew that if they harassed the British merchants enough, the merchants would in turn pressure Parliament and the king to end the war. The popularity of privateering also decreased the number of men fighting in the Continental Army (Patton 124). Navy sailors were particularly attracted to privateering and often abandoned the Navy. While the Continental Navy offered many of the same benefits as privateers (such as a doubled share of the prize for the first sailor to sight an enemy ship and a tripled share for the first sailor to board an enemy vessel), privateers had no regulations against swearing and swearing. it did not require sailors to attend a religious service twice a day (Patton 78). As a result, the government began to impose embargoes on the privateering industry (Patton 124). Before a privateer or merchant ship could leave its home port, the city had to meet the city's military manpower quotas. Not surprisingly, businessmen openly protested the embargo. John Adams also opposed the embargo, stating, “I regret that the embargo was ever imposed. I am against all chains that burden trade. Let the spirit of the people have its way” (qtd. in Patton 124) As the Revolutionary War progressed, the success of the privateers began to wane. In 1777, the.