In Sum Res Volans: The Centrality of the Will for Descartes, Andreea Mihali challenges the standard interpretation of Descartes' work. Many commentators interpret Descartes' arguments in the Meditations to mean that "the essence of the mind consists of thoughts as objects of awareness" (Mihali 149). Instead, Mihali argues that “will is as much a part of the essence of the Cartesian meditating mind as awareness” (Mihali 150). Mihali's interpretation, while it may well be accurate in that will is as central to thought as awareness, is nevertheless a dubious interpretation of Descartes' Meditations. There is substantial doubt that Mihali's interpretive claim can be made regarding Descartes' philosophy and his discussion of thoughts and ideas. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Mihali argues that "will is prominent as consensus, as focus, and as attention" (Mihali 152) for the pre-doubt and post-doubt common person. The author argues that “the pre- and post-doubt person has desires upon which he acts” (Mihali 152). Furthermore, “assent is crucial in such circumstances, as a disengaged attitude is difficult to obtain” (Mihali 152). In other words, Mihali argues that the will is active in thinking because people, even to a minimal extent, direct their thoughts. Will clearly plays a role in judgment and decision making as people's opinions are often guided and directed by their will. Beyond such complex thoughts, however, there seems to be a volitional aspect to the brief ideas and images that come to mind. Whenever an individual looks at an object or hears a specific sound, there is a volitional aspect that directs the senses and processes the information to which they are exposed, no matter how brief and fleeting the thought triggered by the sensory information may be. Therefore, after recognizing that “for Descartes, we become aware of a thought by directly perceiving its form, what Descartes calls an “idea”” (Mihali 153), Mihali argues that “intentionality and awareness are characteristic of all thoughts” (Mihali 153 ). In this way, the idea that will is central to thought seems quite plausible. However, Mihali fails to clearly demonstrate that this is true in the context of Descartes' arguments. Furthermore, the arguments and distinctions Descartes makes regarding thinking seem at odds with Mihali's view. In the third book of the Meditations, Descartes draws a distinction between judgments and momentary thoughts. “Some of these thoughts are like images of things” (Descartes 48) while for “other thoughts that take different forms…I embrace in my thought something more than the likeness of that thing” (Descartes 48). The "first level" of thought refers to the momentary objects of awareness. In other words, it refers to thoughts, such as mental images, that are activated by sensory information obtained "by chance". For example, the mental image that is activated by seeing a car parked on the street. The 'second level' of thinking “are called volitions or affects, while the others are called judgments” (Descartes 48). These are the thoughts that emerge when an individual chooses to use mental images to form a judgment or opinion, using those ideas in deeper thought processing. For example, if you use the mental image of the car to make a judgment or other more complex thought. It seems that Descartes attributes the will, as a central characteristic, to the "second level" of.