QUESTION 1Section 173 states that the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts have inherent power to protect and regulate their own process and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of justice. The civil procedure applied in higher courts does not depend exclusively on the provisions of the law and the rules of the court. For this reason, superior courts are sometimes said to exercise “inherent jurisdiction.” This refers to the higher courts which can do anything that the law does not prohibit in the declaration section. When a court is said to exercise “inherent jurisdiction,” this simply means that its jurisdiction arises from common law and not from statute (although statute, in some cases, may limit or increase this jurisdiction). One of the implications of a higher court exercising its inherent jurisdiction is that it has discretion regarding its procedure. In other words, a court can condone any procedural errors or determine any point in the procedure. On the other hand we have lower courts, magistrates' courts, small claims courts and other bodies vested with judicial or quasi-judicial powers. "while the lower courts cannot do anything that the law does not allow." Lower courts have no inherent jurisdiction. The reason for this is that they derive their powers from the particular statute which created them, such as the magistrates' courts which were established under the terms of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944, the small claims courts which have limited jurisdiction and are handled under simplified procedures for hearing small civil claims under the Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 1984. For this reason, lower courts sometimes find themselves in the middle of paper...... forces the partnership to declare who all the partners were at the time the cause of action arose. S28(1)(b). It provides that a company can be sued in any place where it has business premises or where one of its members residesd) although section 30 expressly gives the magistrates court the power to grant interdicts, it is clear that a mandatory interdict could be seen as a form of specific performance and therefore prohibited by section 46(2)(c), because an order to perform an act is often very similar to an order for specific performance. However, in Badenhorst v Theophanous 1988 (1) SA 793 (C), it was held that magistrates' courts may nevertheless grant mandatory interdicts, provided that such orders do not amount to "ad factum praestandum orders in terms of contractual obligation" . In terms of this V the magistrate's court is competent to exercise jurisdiction.