The Battle of the Little Bighorn is one of the most widely analyzed engagements in United States history. The events leading up to the conflict and the unfolding of the battle have allowed many to learn valuable information and at the same time gain a concrete understanding of what happened on that fateful day. After the Civil War, tensions between Native American tribes and the U.S. Army led to a series of bloody clashes as the United States ambitiously sought westward expansion. General Phillip Sheridan led the three-pronged push to return concentrations of Sioux and Cheyenne Indians to reservations to enable expansion efforts into the Dakotas. Among General Sheridan's commanders was Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer. On June 25, 1876, the Seventh Calvary led by Custer fought and was subsequently annihilated by Cheyenne and Sioux forces along the Little Bighorn River in southern Montana in one of the largest massacres in U.S. history. During the preparation and execution of the Little Bighorn operation, mission command doctrine can be analyzed to gain a greater understanding of how and why the massacre occurred. According to ADRP 6-0 Mission Command, the U.S. Army defines mission command as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to employ agile and adaptable leaders in conducting unified land operations.” .” When applying mission command to the Battle of the Little Bighorn, there are a number of tasks that Custer (as commander) was responsible for carrying out. Lieutenant Colonel Custer demonstrated poor mission command by failing to understand, visualize, direct, and lead during operations...middle of paper...Despite warnings from his own scouts, Custer failed to understand the capabilities of both the Sioux and Cheyenne Indian tribes. Furthermore, Custer unsuccessfully visualized the overall end state of the operation by greatly underestimating the Indian forces he was facing. Custer continually demonstrated poor leadership throughout the operation by dividing his command into three groups and failing to recognize how variables such as terrain would inhibit effective command and control during the engagement. Ultimately, a commander must lead throughout the operational process, and Custer clearly could not lead effectively by dividing his forces prior to engagement. Many failures ultimately led to Custer's defeat, but investigating the battle provides a better understanding of how the application of effective mission command can greatly influence the outcome of any battle..