US doctrine focuses its COIN methods on the ability to assist a host nation in building political legitimacy and credibility. Establishing political legitimacy is the foundation of the COIN strategy that allows governments to build relationships with local leaders and gain community support, while simultaneously eliminating an insurgency. The doctrine is subjective rather than prescriptive; however, failure to adhere to the fundamental principles causes numerous contradictions on how to achieve specific objectives. Evidence provided in the COIN campaigns conducted in both Vietnam and Afghanistan showed imperfect implementation of core principles of U.S. counterinsurgency. Those principles include the ability to establish a sound political and security strategy, all with a host nation leading the effort. Although these two wars have many differences, they are similar in many ways. Specifically, how the United States has failed to follow basic COIN practices and how leveraging lessons learned is critical to U.S. strategic initiatives. Political Strategy A premise of the COIN doctrine calls for a long-term political strategy that implements government legitimacy by instilling effectiveness in the eyes of the governed. How can you build a successful COIN campaign by supporting weak surrogate leadership as the United States did in both Vietnam and Afghanistan? Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam and Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan are both examples of failed leadership supported by the United States in its attempt to influence political reform. The United States based its support for Diem on the basis of his religious background, his anti-communist position and, above all, his relationship with US officials. US officials also favored Karzai who had a shared interest in extraditing the rebel Taliban regime. Unfortunately, these leaders have shown hesitation in reforming themselves in the Western democratic institution